

Message Text

PAGE 01 SALT T 00098 162007 Z

52

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

----- 075854

O P 161725 Z MAR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1866

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T USDEL SALT TWO II 0098

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV MINI PLENARY STATEMENT, MARCH 16 1973

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT PRESENTED BY
MINISTER SEMENOV, FRIDAY, MARCH 16, 1973. SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 16,
1973

AT THE PHASE OF THE SOVIET- AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WAS BEGUN
THIS WEEK, PRINCIPAL ATTENTION FOCUSES ON THE PROBLEM OF WORKING
OUT AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS IS A RESPONSIBLE TASK, AND A GOOD BASIS FOR ITS
POSITIVE SOLUTION, IT SEEMS TO US, MUST BE THE PRINCIPLES
RECORDED IN THE SOVIET- AMERICAN DOCUMENTS ADOPTED AS A RESULT
OF THE SUMMIT TALKS IN MOSCOW IN MAY 1972.

WHAT ARE THESE PRINCIPLES? WHAT IS THEIR SIGNIFICANCE? I WOULD LIKE
TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THAT.

THE DOCUMENT BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
SIGNED MOSCOW,

RECORDS THAT THE USSR AND THE U. S. " WILL
SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00098 162007 Z

PROCEED FROM THE COMMON DETERMINATION THAT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO CONDUCTING THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS ON

THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE." EXPRESSING THEIR READINESS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLE DIFFERENCES BY PEACEFUL MEANS, THE SIDES EMPHASIZED THAT " DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON OUT STANDING ISSUES WILL BE CONDUCTED IN A SPIRIT OF RECIPROCITY, MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION AND MUTUAL BENEFIT. THE DOCUMENT ALSO RECORDS THE INTENTION OF THE SIDES " TO MAKE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS. WHENEVER POSSIBLE, THEY WILL CONCLUDE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AIMED AT ACHIEVING THESE PURPOSES."

THESE PROVISIONS CONTAIN IMPORTANT PREREQUISITES FOR BUILDING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U. S. IN ALL AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS, ON A LASTING AND LONG- TERM BASIS. THEY OPEN UP BROAD POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING STABLE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES, WITHOUT ANY PREJUDICE WHATSOEVER TO THIRD COUNTRIES.

THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE ALSO MOST PERTINENT TO THE CONDUCT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE ABM TREATY THE SIDES SOLEMNLY DECLARED THEIR INTENTION " TO ACHIEVE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TOWARD REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT." THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, NOT ONLY PUT AN END TO THE RACE IN ABM SYSTEMS, BUT ARE ALSO AIMED AT SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE CURBING OF THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THE TEXT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT POINTS OUT THAT THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS " WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS AS WELL AS TO THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF TRUST BETWEEN STATES." THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH HAVE ENTERED INTO FORCE, IN THEMSELVES CONSTITUTE A FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00098 162007 Z

THE PRINCIPLES CITED IN RELATION TO THE RANGE OF PROBLEMS FACING US HERE IN GENEVA WOULD, WE ARE CONVINCED, BE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET- AMERICAN RELATIONS.

A MUTUALLY AGREED AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE, THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS TO MOVE AHEAD SUCCESSFULLY, IS THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND PRECLUSION OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IN OUR SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WE MUST UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BASE OUR-

SELVES WHOLLY AND FULLY ON THIS PRINCIPLE, WHICH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, NOT SUPPLANTING IT BY ANY SORT OF OTHER PRINCIPLES OF A UNILATERAL NATURE. WE HAVE ALREADY REFERRED TO THE DOCUMENTS IN WHICH THIS PRINCIPLE IS RECORDED. THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IN APPROACHING THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PRINCIPLE, THE EXISTING STRATEGIC SITUATION MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING THE PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF THE SIDES, THE PRESENCE ON BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES OF NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS OTHER APPROPRIATE FACTORS.

BRIEFLY SUMMARIZING, AS IT WERE, WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, IT COULD EVIDENTLY BE ESTABLISHED THAT:

IN WORKING OUT AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE SIDES WILL BE GUIDED BY THE PREMISE THAT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING MUST BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES RECORDED IN THE DOCUMENT BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA OF MAY 29, 1972, AND IN THE OTHER SOVIET- AMERICAN DOCUMENTS SIGNED IN MAY 1972 IN MOSCOW.

IN SO DOING, THE SIDES WILL PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE OF IMPORTANT SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSTITUTE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD CURBING AND EVENTUALLY HALTING THE RACE IN ARMAMENTS AND THAT THEIR LIMITATION AND GRADUAL REDUCTION ARE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING WORLD PEACE.

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00098 162007 Z

APPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN MAY 1972 IN MOSCOW IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO FIND WAYS TO CONVERT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT INTO A PERMANENT TREATY, WITH APPROPRIATE EXPANSION OF ITS CONTENT AND TRANSITION FROM LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO REDUCING THEM GRADUALLY, AND TO ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS ON THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. IN SO DOING, MEASURES OF THAT KIND WILL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF ENSURING EQUAL SECURITY AND PRECLUDING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

MR. AMBASSADOR

IT IS NATURAL THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST ALSO EXTEND TO THOSE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

WEAPONS WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INCLUDE, IN ADDITION TO LAND- BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SUBMARINE- LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS, ALSO ANY TYPES OF MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND ANY TYPES OF NUCLEAR- DELIVERY AIRCRAFT WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT ENABLES THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS CARRIER- BASED DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, REGARDLESS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF ATTACK CARRIERS.

THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTIONS OF LIMITING THE ENTIRE COMPLEX OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ON- GOING NEGOTIATIONS WILL GUARANTEE SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS ENTRUSTED TO US. JOHNSON

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 07 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 MAR 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT00098
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TWO II
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730348/abqcehug.tel
Line Count: 182
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <14-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> jms 971211
Subject: SEMENOV MINI PLENARY STATEMENT, MARCH 16 1973
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE INFO MOSCOW
NATO
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005